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HEARINGS OF
JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 722 OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
February 6, 1946

Statement of Maurice Austin, Chairman of the
Committee on Federal Taxation of the
American Institute of Accountants
To the Honorable Members of
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation:
This statement is respectfully submitted on behalf of the

Committee on Federal Taxation of the American Institute of Accountants.
The American Institute of Accountants is the only national
organization of certified public accountants.
exoess of 9,000.

Its members number in

Public accountants, probably more than any other

group, have a direct and intimate contact with the practical adminis
tration of the tax lavs, including the section under consideration.
This statement represents the carefully considered views of the

Institute's Committee on Federal Taxation, which consists of members
chosen for their ability, experience and reputation in the field of

taxation, and is based not only upon the experiences of the members
of that committee, but also upon the experiences of many others which,

in one way or another, have been brought to the attention of the
committee.
We wish to make it clear at the outset that this statement

is not made in the spirit of criticism, but in a sincere endeavor to
place before this Joint Committee pertinent facts, as we see them,
regarding the administration of Section 722 of the Internal Revenue

Code, and constructive suggestions and recommendations for the im

provement of such administration in the interest of both government
Representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and

and taxpayer.

of the Treasury Department will be the first to affirm that our past

record demonstrates a sympathetic understanding of the Bureau’s
practical problems of administration and of active cooperation on our

part in their solution.
We have recognized from the beginning that Section 722

placed upon the Bureau a heavy and unprecedented administrative burden

which, by reason of its nature and the amounts involved, has assumed
an importance out of all proportion to its place in the tax structure.
As you know,

the form of relief provided by Section 722 is available

when, for certain specified reasons, neither invested capital nor
actual prewar earnings furnish an adequate standard of normal pre-war
earning power,

so that determination of excess profits tax liability

under the general formulas provided in the Code result in an excessive
and discriminatory tax.

To obtain relief in such cases it is neces

sary to establish what normal pre-war, i.e., base period, earnings
would have been had certain conditions then existed which, in fact,

did not exist.

Many claims for such relief have been filed, involving

large amounts.

The details regarding this are set forth in the Bureau’s

statement, and, although the Bureau’s figures on the amounts of refund

claimed do not give effect to the substantial offset represented by

the corresponding increase in income tax liability,

the sums involved,

though smaller than the eight billion dollars referred to in the
Bureau’s statement are nevertheless very substantial.
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We do not wonder.

therefore,

that, faced with an elusive problem of this nature, in

volving so much money and so many taxpayers,

the administrative

officials are found to exercise extreme caution, to be wary of

creating precedents with unforeseeable repercussions, and to proceed
slowly before important points are determined by litigation.

We are not here primarily concerned with slowness of admin
istration.

We are much more concerned with sound and proper administra

tion, than with speedy administration; and, while undue delay in ad

ministration may undoubtedly nullify,

to a large extent, the rights

granted by law, we should much prefer a slower,

but sound, equitable

and proper administration of these provisions, than a speedy one which

merely succeeds in crowding the litigation calendars and transferring

the delay from one point to another.
In its statement,

the Bureau has given its reasons for slow

ness in progress of administration to date.

we agree.

With most of these reasons

The section is difficult and involves entirely new problems.

The number of claims and amounts involved are large.

Many claims, per

haps a substantial proportion of the whole, are ill-founded or ill-

prepared.

Like all other employers,

the Bureau has suffered serious

wartime shortages, both in number and in qualificationsof personnel.
The number of taxpaying returns to be processed has multiplied.
Other pressing problems, referred to in the Bureau statement, have

preoccupied Bureau attention and manpower.

Many taxpayers naturally

wishing to await clarification of a section of such unprecedented
nature, and desirous of not being included among the guinea-pigs for

precedent-making litigation, have delayed filing or implementing
their claims.

Many taxpayers, faced with a deadline filing date on

September 15, 1943 (subsequently extended by statutory amendment),
filed so-called skeleton claims to protect their rights, without

opportunity to explore fully what rights to relief they actually had.
It is with a full understanding of these circumstances that we say

that, for the immediate present, we are much more concerned with the
kind of administration than with its speed.

We believe that the Bureau of Internal Revenue has honestly
and sincerely tried to administer this section fairly, as it sees it.
also believe,

We

at the same time, however, that under present conditions

of organization and procedure,

the very nature and history of the

Bureau, its tradition and training, and its past relations with Congress,
make it inevitable that in its administration of this section,
despite its best intentions,

should assume an adversary character,

apply the section narrowly and restrictively, and,
interpretation of the section arise,

many cases, unnecessarily,

the Bureau,
should

where questions of

should almost invariably, and in

select the interpretation unfavorable to

claimants generally, - all resulting in unnecessarily forcing many

meritorious claims to litigation.
consensus of our experience, and,

That this is the condition is the
this condition, we cannot emphasize

too strongly, we believe to be the product of circumstances and not of

intention.

The features of present administration which have been most
prolific of dissatisfaction may be classified generally as involving

(1) Bureau attitude or approach to administration,

(2) certain apparent

limitations of the present statute which, of course,

the Bureau must

administer as it finds it, and (3) unduly narrow interpretations by the
Bureau of specific points involving application of the section.
these the first is by far the most important.

Of

Accordingly, while

recommendations with respect to all of these phases are set forth
later herein, it seems appropriate to expand briefly at this point on
the matter of general attitude or approach to administration.
At the present time it is the general experience that an

application for relief is all too frequently (though not,
universally)

of course,

approached by Bureau officials with a view to finding

reaeons, whether technical or real, for disallowing the claim, rather
than in a real effort to determine to what extent, if any, it has

merit.

It is the all-too-common experience to receive a revenue

agent's report recommending rejection of the claim with the mere state
ment, recited in stereotyped pattern,

that the taxpayer has not estab

lished qualification for relief and has not established a constructive

base period income representing normal earnings.

This may occur after

the agent has made an extensive examination and requested and received

voluminous data or, as happens in many other cases, without even a

conference with the taxpayer’s representatives.

To a large, although

lesser, degree, a similar attitude prevails at higher field levels.
This attitude is not confined to claims which obviously lack merit,

although the probably large number of groundless claims is a contribu
tory factor.

We consider this condition to be the result of a belief

current throughout the Bureau’s field offices as to the attitude
toward these claims of the Washington reviewing sections and policymaking officials.

This general impression has been created, we believe,
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by the nature and character of the regulations and bulletin issued
by the Bureau, which appear to be primarily concerned with limitations,

cautions and unacceptable claims,

theories and procedures, as well as

by the high percentage of complete or partial rejections by the review

divisions in Washington of claims allowed in whole or in part in the

field. The fact that rejections in the field are not subject to
Washington review or criticism, while complete or partial allowances

are subject to such review, is another factor.
We believe that this condition has been made inevitable by

the following factors, among others.
(1) The Bureau of Internal Revenue is by nature, training and
tradition, the watchdog of the Treasury, and inevitably
assumes an adversary, rather than a judicial, position —
with the consequent natural tendency to develop reasons,
technical or otherwise, for disallowing claims, instead
of exerting efforts to determine the extent of their merit.
This condition is accentuated by the procedure of having
the relief claims processed by the same personnel and in
the same manner as the ordinary run of tax issues, with
respect to which an adversary attitude on the part of the
Bureau has become accustomed procedure.

(2) Past experience with Congressional review of its activities
have made the possibility of Congressional criticism an
ever-present factor affecting Bureau policy and impelling
it always to support its disposition of tax cases by a
record so well documented as to be beyond all criticism.
This condition is normally conducive to sound administra
tion.
In the present instance, however, by reason of the
fact that the section deals with substantial refunds of
taxes on profits realized during the war years, based upon
factors not susceptible of precise mathematical determina
tion, and involving essentially personal judgments regarding
which men may easily differ, the concern about Congressional
criticism has reached a stage of super-caution, which tends
to resolve all doubts of interpretation against the tax
payer and to require a degree of proof which the nature of
the subject does not permit.
(3) The Bureau, over its entire history, has generally dealt with
matters which were capable of mathematical or quasi-mathe
matical demonstration.
Such an approach to the administra
tion of section 722 is utterly inappropriate and unworkable.
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The problem is analogous to that involved in the re
negotiation of war contracts and calls for a similar
approach toward its solution.
While the inappropriate
ness of mathematical solution of section 722 cases is
recognized in the Bureau statement, it is difficult
for personnel, trained in the matters which normally
confront the Bureau, to deal with Section 722 cases by
the radically different method of deriving a "fair and
just” figure for normal prewar earnings by applying to
the pertinent facts a considered judgment of what is
reasonable under all of the circumstances .
Other problems coming under this general heading of adminis

tration may be referred to briefly as follows:
(a) The present procedure of processing section 722 claims to
gether with all other matters affecting a corporation’s
tax liability, has made possible an unfortunate practice
in many field offices of insisting upon the withdrawal
of section 722 relief claims as a condition for the settle
ment or dropping of other totally unrelated issues.
This
frequently happens at a time when the merits of section
722 claims have not been explored, and, in some cases, in
fact, even before a section 722 claim has been filed.
While the inclusion of a section 722 claim in a general
settlement may be entirely proper where its merits have
been weighed and taken into account in the settlement,
this procedure seems to be utterly unfair and out of
place where that is not the situation.

(b) The manpower shortages have so far made it not possible for
the Bureau to have these claims processed in the field
by a sufficient number of personnel adequately trained
for this purpose.
This, of course, is a product of war
time conditions and presumably will be remedied as
rapidly as conditions permit.
(c) The proof called for in many section 722 cases requires
figures of sales, costs and earnings of other corpora
tions, usually competitors.
In the very nature of things,
these figures, while available to the Bureau, are not
available to the taxpayer except in those relatively few
cases where trade associations have secured such data.
This places claimants at a serious disadvantage in the
handling of their claims.
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While there is the right of review by an impartial body,

the Tax Court of the United States, there are several reasons why
this remedy is a far from adequate means of dealing with the situa
tion which the present conditions of administration are bound to

create.

The Tax Court is burdened with proceedings involving many

types of tax issues, of which Section 722 is presumably only a minor
part, in addition to which it is charged with the duty of hearing
appeals in renegotiation cases.

The number of Section 722 cases

which, under present conditions of administration, will reach the
Tax Court will clog its calendars for years.

The procedure of the

Court is formal and is subject to formal rules of evidence.

Facts

nut submitted for the Commissioner's review may not be proved in a
Section 722 proceeding in the Tax Court.

This type of procedure is

singularly inappropriate for the types of issues involved in Section.

722 proceedings, involving, as they do, intimate details of operating
conditions, manufacturing costs, demand and general economic data,

particularly in the cycle and depressed industry cases.

We would

view the matter differently if procedure for processing claims within

the Bureau were designed or in fact operated to apprise the claimant,
through responsible Bureau officials, of the alleged deficiencies of
his claim or proof in support thereof, so as to enable him to supply

appropriate supporting data if he can.

Under present actual condi

tions of Bureau procedure, the claimant seldom learns authoritatively
what shortcomings of proof the Bureau alleges in his case, with cor

responding lack of opportunity to develop a complete factual case be

fore formal trial in the Tax Court, when it is often too late.

The

attitude of Bureau representatives in most instances is to assert

Inadequacy of proof or merit without real effort to specify the short

comings, relying upon the taxpayer’s burden of proof to support their
position.
An orderly and fair administration of a section such as thia

demands that there be some forum in which claimants may have their
claims heard under an informal procedure in which factual controversies,
if any, can be resolved Informally, the positions of both sides defined,

and the opportunity to remedy factual deficiencies in the light of the
positions thus taken, and tn which such claims will be passed upon by

officials with a responsibility which will support the proper exercise
of the type of personal Judgment required by these cases, and which
will not be trammelled by tradition and training and past relations

with Congressional Committees, which interfere with the use of an

approach to these cases more appropriate than that which is suitable
in the ordinary run of tax issues.
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We submit the following recommendations:
I.

An independent advisory board should be established to hear Section

722 cases, upon the application of claimants, under informal procedures,
and to make recommendations for disposition, which shall be prima facie

correct in any subsequent proceeding in the Tax Court,

It is visualized that upon failure of agreement after ex

haustion of procedures available within the Bureau, a tentative notice
of die allowance would be issued by the Commissioner, within thirty

days of which the taxpayer would have the right to apply for hearing

before the advisory board.

The Commissioner would be required to re

fer to the Board; all facts before him relating to the claim, including

such general economic facts as the Commissioner has considered in

arriving at his conclusions, and to define his position with respect
to the claim.

Both sides would be entitled to submit additional facts

from time to time during the course of the proceeding and would be

required to furnish, to the extent possible, such data as the Board
might deem necessary.

Proceedings before the Board would be informal

and not subject to formal rules of evidence.

The Board member or

members would indicate in what respects they tentatively agreed or

disagreed with the contentions of the parties and the adequacy of
their proof.

The hearings would be held in one or more sessions, with

such reasonable adjournments for submission of additional data, as may
best promote a Just determination.
The Board would be established as an independent agency,

outside the Treasury Department, consisting of a number of members
on a full-time basis, sufficient to hold regional sittings if the
Board would deem that expedient, and should be adequately financed
and staffed with its own experts.

The Board, if it could not bring about an agreement between

the parties, would render a report, setting forth findings and conclu
sions of fact, whether or not the applicant qualifies for relief and
on what grounds, a determination of constructive base period net income

and a statement of the facts and conclusions upon which such determina

tion is based.
Such report would be advisory, but, in any subsequent pro

ceeding in the Tax Court, such report, both as to facts and conclusions
would be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof would be on the

party expressing disagreement with such report, in whole or in part.

To the extent not controverted in the pleadings and refuted by proof,
the report of the Board would be binding on the Tax Court.

Under

these conditions, proof before the Tax Court would properly be limited

to facts submitted to the Board.
We believe that this procedure would create a forum much
more suitable than any now existing for the proper disposition of

these claims.

We do not feel that such a Board would be "softer" or

any readier to grant refunds unjustifiably, or insensitive to
Congressional review, nor should it be.

We are convinced, however,

that under such a procedure claims would get the kind of hearing
appropriate to their nature, which the present procedure does not

afford, and that it would tend, to a substantial degree, to prevent
an accumulation of Section 722 oases from clogging the calendars of

the already overworked Tax Court.
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II.

The last sentence of Section 722(e) should be deleted, with

retroactive effect.

This sentence requires that, with certain exceptions, in

determining constructive average base period net income, no regard
shall be had to events or conditions occurring or existing after
December 31, 1939.

Probably no single provision has done as much as

this one to nullify merited relief.

Taxpayers commencing business

toward the end of 1939, or later, or undergoing a change in management
or other change in character of the business toward the end of 1939,

generally find it impossible for lack of experience, to establish
constructive earnings on the basis of their new operating conditions.

The two-year push-back rule becomes almost impossible to apply in many
cases.

In computing costs under new operating conditions giving effect

to the pushback rule, the taxpayer is forbidden, for example, to deter

mine its typical factory payroll by reference to its fully developed

operating conditions in 1941, which would be the best source of such data.
It is recognized, of course, that post-1939 figures, involving
war years as they do, must be used with caution.

In some cases, they

would be so affected by war economy conditions as to be entirely useless
as evidence from which to help draw inferences as to normal pre-1940

figures.

In other cases, comparison with industry statistics will

suggest simple procedures for eliminating post-1939 factors from the
figures.

In still other oases, no adjustment will be necessary. Where,

for example, post-1939 data are resorted to for the purpose of determin
ing the number of machine operators required in a given department

under given conditions, war economy conditions are a totally irrelevant

factor, and there is no sound reason for denying use of such figures.
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It is not suggested by any means that post-1939 figures
be given anything approaching determinative weight.

merely that they be admissible as evidence,

It is suggested

to be given such weight

and used in such manner as may seem proper to the administrative

agencies and the Tax Court, consistent with the purposes of the
section.

Surely sound administration can be trusted to use properly,

and not to misuse, such data, particularly if appropriate cautions

be expressed by the Congressional Committees.
The present prohibition against use of post-1939 data was
prompted by a fear that it would not be possible to extract therefrom

the "contaminating" influence of the war economy.

Although this is

a formidable difficulty, we believe that its proportions have been

exaggerated, and that the problem can be safely dealt with administra

tively.

In an effort to protect the administrative agencies and Tax

Court against themselves, this provision has tied them in a strait
Jacket, which completely nullifies merited relief in many cases, and

has created a situation in which the taxpayer, while unable to use

post-1939 to support his case, frequently finds such data used to re
fute his claim.

This is done not only by the Bureau, but by the Tax

Court as well (as in the Monarch Cap Screw and Manufacturing Co. case.)
Even the Bureau bulletin does the same thing by providing that where

a pre-1940 change in capacity which qualifies for relief is abandoned
after 1939, constructive base period income based on such change in
capacity will not be allowed.
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III.

Thia Joint Committee should make a clear and unequivocal

statement, endorsed by the Ways and Means and Finance committees.

as to its interpretation of the points set forth in IV, below.
As already stated, fear of Congressional criticism has

caused the Bureau, in our opinion, to adopt unduly narrow Interpreta
tions as to the proper method of applying the section.

We believe

that a clear interpretative statement by this Joint Committee,

endorsed as above indicated, could and would be followed by the
Bureau and by the Tax Court without cause for concern about subsequent
criticism for adopting the interpretations thus stated, and would be
a tremendously important factor in facilitating disposition of pending

claims and avoiding needless litigation.

nature of this suggestion.

We recognize the unprecedented

Practically speaking, however, such a

statement would differ but little from similar interpretations con

tained in the conventional type of Congressional Committee report.
The situation is extraordinary and calls for a like remedy.

alternative is years of litigation.

The

It is in recognition of the

unusual nature of our suggestion that, although the disputed points

of interpretation are numerous, we have confined the present sugges
tion to a relatively small number of points which have been a large

source of difficulty.

IV.

It is suggested that the Joint Committee state its views on at

least the following disputed points of interpretation:
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A. Concept of "normal earnings"
Section 722(a) refers to the establishment in these cases

of a "fair and just amount representing normal earnings to be
used as a constructive average base period net income for the

purposes of an excess profits tax based upon a comparison of

normal earnings and earnings during an excess profits tax period."
The Bureau apparently has interpreted this to mean that it is

necessary to establish what the arithmetical average of the tax
payer’s base period earnings would have been under normal condi

tions of operations, giving effect not only to correction of the

various abnormalities or commencement or change in character of
the business which qualified the taxpayer for relief, but also
giving effect to the elimination of other, unrelated, conditions
believed to be not "normal," and without necessarily giving effect

to the methods of computation of average base period net income

provided by Section 713 in the case of all taxpayers.

We believe, on the other hand, that what was intended by
the quoted language was a figure representing the average base
period net income to which the taxpayer would have been entitled
under Section 713 had the depressant abnormalities not existed
or had the taxpayer throughout the base period enjoyed the earn
ings level which it had attained actually or constructively by

the end of the base period in cases of commencement or change in
character of the business.

We believe that our view of the situation necessarily follows

from the preposition that the main purpose of Section 722 was to

eliminate discrimination between taxpayers similarly situated, as
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is evidenced by the provision that this relief ba granted where

the tax computed in the ordinary way is "excessive and discrimina
tory," and that this objective can be accomplished only if the

computation of the taxpayer’s average base period income be modi
fied to take account of the conditions which create the discrim

ination, without denying to the claimant the benefit of other
factors, conditions, and methods of computation, the benefits of

which are available to the large number of "other taxpayers

similarly situated."
This point is basic and underlies a number of the disputes
now prevailing between the Bureau and taxpayers.

One of the

important applications of the point involved is set forth in B,

below.

We consider it to be clearly discriminatory, for example,

if a taxpayer which has suffered a disturbing event qualifying
it for relief should be required to exclude from its base period
Income the effect of conditions affecting taxpayers generally

during the base period, even though in an abstract sense not

"normal" (whether the European war or any other general condi
tion), while the vast majority of other taxpayers not suffering

such disturbing events are allowed to benefit from the increased

base period earnings due to the very same conditions.
B. Application of the growth formula and 75% rule
in Section 722 cases

The Bureau’s position is that in reconstructing normal base
period earnings the subnormality of one or more years in the base

period will have been taken into account and that there is no
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room for application of Section 713(e)(1), which provides that,

in averaging the income of the base period years, the lowest

the average of the other three,

year shall be raised to 75% of

in effect providing that the average base period net income shall

be no less than 93-3/4%

the average of the three best years.

(It is to be noted that the 75% rule is an automatic rule not

dependent on a showing of subnormality for any base period year.)

The Bureau also takes the position that application of the
growth formula contained tn Section 713(f)
must depend on the circumstances.

to Section 722 cases

In practice, use of the growth

formula in such cases is virtually never allowed.

The Bureau’s position seems to be that the 75% rule and
growth formula are in themselves relief measures and are in effect

superseded and included when reconstructed base period earnings
are established under Section 722.

We believe that one of the prime purposes of Section 722
was to eliminate discrimination between taxpayers similarly
situated (note that the section applies where the tax is excessive
and discriminatory); and that this purpose is not accomplished,

where reconstruction is made separately for each base period year,
if, after reconstruction of the income of each base period year

to eliminate abnormalities or give effect to change in character

of the business,

etc., the average is not computed under the same

rules (i.e., 75% rule and growth formula) applicable to every
other corporation.

Thus,
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Example:

The taxpayer had a fire in 1939 which reduced its earnings;
its competitor did not.

The figures of both companies would be

alike were it not for the fire.

The actual and reconstructed

figures are as follows?

Taxpayer
Actual
Recon
figures structed

1936
1937
1938
1939

$150,000
180,000
60,000
150,000

$150,000
180,000
60,000
200,000

Competitor
$150,000
180,000
60,000
200,000

Average base period net
income:
Actual - giving effect
to the 75% rule. . .

196,875

150,000

Reconstructed:

Per Bureau - not giving
effect to 75% rule .

147,500

Giving effect to 75%
rule........... .

196,875

In this case the Bureau would grant no relief although the

claimant’s base period earnings have been adversely affected by
the abnormal fire occurrence, in the absence of which its average

base period net income would have been $196,875 instead of
$150,000.
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C, Application of the two-year pushback rule.

The pushback rule gives the claimant the benefit of two
additional assumed years of development in establishing the level
for reconstructing normal pre-war earnings, where the business

was commenced or a change in character of the business occurred

during or immediately before the base period and the business of

the claimant did not reach normal earning level by the end of
the base period.

The Bureau’s position in applying this rule is

that account may be taken only of those changes which actually
occurred before the end of the base period and that no account
may be taken of changes which did not actually occur during the
base period but which would in normal course occur during an
additional two year development period.

Thus, if production of

a new product is started in the base period, the Bureau’s com

putation of the effect of two years’ additional development with
this product would be limited to the taxpayer’s productive

capacity actually existing or subject to commitment at the end
of the base period, and would not take into account the fact

that expansion of sales of the new product would in normal course
lead to expansion of capacity, particularly where additional

capacity means merely rental or relatively inexpensive purchase
of additional machines.

Another Illustration is afforded by

change in management cases.

Changes in management frequently

bring about changes in method of operation, new products, in

creases in capacity.

The Bureau limits the reconstruction in

such cases to the changes actually put into effect or committed
for (in case of capacity changes) by the end of the base period

and does not take into account the further changes which the
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changed management would normally be expected to put into ef
fect during an additional two-year development period.

This

point may also affect businesses newly commenced.

We believe that under the pushback rule the taxpayer is

entitled to take into account all changes which would reasonably

be expected to be put into effect during a two year additional
development period as a result of the changes actually affected
during the base period.

D. Nature of commitment to a course of action resulting in a

post-1939 change in capacity.
It is provided in Section 722(b)(4) that the taxpayer may
take into account a change in capacity for operation or production

occurring after December 31, 1939, as a result of a course of ac
tion to which the taxpayer was committed prior to 1940.

It was

clearly indicated in the Congressional Committee reports at the
time of the enactment of this section that a legally binding com
mitment was not contemplated.
bulletin do not, it is true,

The Treasury regulations and

stipulate the necessity of a legally

binding commitment, but do require either that, or some overt
action, withdrawal from which would work a substantial detriment
to the taxpayer.

Usually this means either a legal commitment or

the expenditure of sums in partial carrying out of the course of
action, which would be lost in whole or in substantial part if
the course of action were abandoned.

In practice, a legally

binding commitment is almost invariably insisted upon.

One form

of this difficulty appears in cases where the taxpayer has acquired
or obligated itself to purchase certain pieces of equipment
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constituting parts of a larger unit, with no legally binding
obligation to purchase the balance of the pieces of equipment

in the unite

Sometimes there is an option to purchase the re

maining pieces, and in other cases there is no
But, in the cases which we have in mind,

such option.

the logic of the situ

ation is clear that the taxpayer would not have purchased or

obligated itself to buy the first pieces of equipment, if it
did not ultimately intend to acquire the balance.

This type

of case almost universally meets with difficulty of acceptance.
We believe that a commitment within the meaning of Section

722(b)(4) is sufficiently established by the production of

evidence of an unequivocal decision made prior to 1940 to
embark upon the course of action, whether or not a legally

binding obligation was Incurred and whether or not the taxpayer
can comply with the detriment test stipulated in the Bureau

bulletin.

Respectfully submitted,

Maurice Austin
Chairman, Committee on Federal Taxation
American Institute of Accountants
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